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Abstract 
We examine employment effects, such as wages and employee turnover, before, during, and after 
periods of fraudulent financial reporting. To analyze these effects, we combine U.S. Census data 
with SEC enforcement actions against firms with serious misreporting (“fraud”). We find, 
compared to a matched sample, that fraud firms’ employee wages decline by 9% and the separation 
rate is higher by 12% during and after fraud periods. Employment growth at fraud firms is positive 
during fraud periods and negative afterward. We explore the heterogeneous effects of fraudulent 
financial reporting, including thin and thick labor markets, bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy firms, 
worker movements, pre-fraud wage levels, and period of hire. Negative wage effects are 
particularly severe in thin labor markets, for bankrupt, fraud firms, and lower wage employees. 
However, some negative wage effects occur across these sample cuts, indicating that fraudulent 
financial reporting appears to create meaningful and prevalent consequences for employees. We 
discuss how our results can be consistent with channels such as labor market disruptions, 
punishment, and stigma. 
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1. Introduction 
Accounting fraud is an important issue in the economy. Large accounting scandals occur 
regularly (e.g., Waste Management, Enron, WorldCom, Computer Sciences, Toshiba, and so on), 
and the consequences are usually significant. For example, Karpoff et al. (2008b) find that firms 
lose about 29% of equity value when the fraud is revealed. An extensive academic literature has 
also documented severe consequences of fraudulent reporting for other stakeholders, including 
customers, executives, and peer firms (e.g., Sadka, 2006; Desai et al., 2006; Beatty et al., 2013). 
However, prior papers rarely study labor market consequences, which can be large; for example, 
17,000 workers lost jobs from WorldCom alone in June 2002 (Noguchi, 2002). In this paper, we 
examine these consequences of fraudulent financial reporting for employees. Specifically, we ask 
and answer several questions. Do employees suffer financially or benefit from accounting fraud in 
the form of higher wages prior to revelation? After revelation, do they suffer from wage declines 
or turnover? Do these effects vary in the cross-section, for instance by thickness of the labor market 
or period of hire? If we observe such effects, why? 
Accounting fraud has three distinct features that make it important to examine these 
consequences. First, executives attempt to hide accounting fraud; this opacity could mislead 
employees as it does other stakeholders, like peer firms that make inefficient investment decisions 
using misleading financial information (e.g., Beatty et al., 2013). Second, papers in economics and 
finance have found consequences for employees from shocks to the firm, such as layoffs, 
regulation, offshoring, or bankruptcy.1 Employees are important stakeholders of the firm; their 
                                                 
1  For example, some papers include Jacobson et al. (1993), Walker (2013), Hummels et al. (2014), and Graham et 
al. (2016). Worker displacement often causes negative consequences in these settings; however, wages can go up 
when workers switch firms voluntarily (e.g., Mincer, 1986). 
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long-run fortunes rise and fall with those of firms through, for example, investment in firm-specific 
human capital (Becker, 1993). Executives could take real actions during fraudulent reporting 
periods like overinvest in physical and human capital (Kedia and Philippon, 2009), and employees 
would suffer later when these excess investments are unwound, losing this specific capital or job 
hunting in unfavorable conditions. Third, executives mainly decide to misreport, but this corporate 
misconduct could have an effect on all of the employees. Workers can suffer from the reputation 
of their work history (Fama, 1980), so association with misconduct could cause penalty or stigma 
in future. These three features suggest that accounting fraud can be relevant for employees. 
One important empirical challenge arises from our research questions; employee data are not 
commonly available. We use the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD) and 
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) datasets from the U.S. Census Bureau. These are an 
important data source for addressing questions related to employees in the United States (e.g., 
Hyatt and McEntarfer, 2012). These data contain workers’ entire wage series across employers 
and a rich set of characteristics, such as worker age, education, gender, and employer location and 
industry. We combine this employer-employee data with Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) to proxy for fraudulent financial 
reporting. Our final sample includes about 200 cases of fraud at firms employing a worker in one 
of 23 states over the period 1991–2008; we use wage data from 414 thousand workers who were 
employed at these firms in the years leading up to the accounting fraud.2 
                                                 
2  Output from projects that use private U.S. Census data have strict rounding criteria that prevents us from providing 
a precise observation count in our analyses. In addition, the application process for using U.S. Census data for 
academic studies requires that individual states approve the project’s use of data from that state. For an AAER case 
to enter our sample, the misreporting firm must have an employee in a participating state, among other sample 
criteria. 
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For our main tests, we examine employee wages and turnover during and after fraudulent 
financial reporting between fraud and control samples. To select the control workers, we 
propensity score match the fraud firms to control firms within industry and year prior to the AAER 
misreporting. Control workers are employees of these control firms. This matching reduces 
endogeneity concerns about employee wage trends at firms that have firm characteristics 
associated with fraudulent reporting. Some challenges remain; fraud firms plausibly suffer a series 
of economic shocks (e.g., Schrand and Zechman, 2012) or have a unique employee composition. 
We use employer location and industry data within the LEHD to include specifications with 
extensive fixed effects to rule out shocks such as regional and industry downturns. We also vary 
our control sample. (i) We match firms using hand-collected firm data from the fraud period to 
control for temporal shocks. And (ii) we use the employee characteristics data from the LEHD to 
match subsamples of employees on these characteristics to control for unique worker 
compositions.3 These data and designs provide a reasonable approach to isolate the consequences 
of fraudulent financial reporting for employees. 
We find that employees at fraud firms, compared to the matched control sample, have about 
9% lower earnings on average during and after periods of fraudulent financial reporting. This 
negative consequence is robust to a variety of specifications, including models with extensive fixed 
effects and various control groups. Descriptive splits show that worker displacement contributes 
substantially to these wage effects. These wage declines exist despite increased employment 
growth at fraud firms during the accounting fraud. During the fraud, firms shed existing workers, 
i.e., those employed in the pre-fraud period. These results combine to indicate that firms hire even 
                                                 
3  We also perform untabulated robustness tests and draw similar inferences, including the use of unmatched, random 
employees within industry and characteristic-matched employees within industry at otherwise unmatched firms. 
We caution that matching does not fully resolve endogeneity issues (e.g., Roberts and Whited, 2013). However, 
descriptive data still provide useful evidence on the consequences for employees at fraud firms. 
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more employees that are new, causing a change to employee mix. Plausibly, executives engineer 
this composition change to show headcount growth and keep the wage bill low (e.g., as McNichols 
and Stubben, 2008, suggest with R&D expenditures at fraud firms). New employees may join 
because fraudulent reporting prevents them from realizing that the “ship is sinking” (Brown and 
Matsa, 2016). We see negative employment growth at fraud firms after the fraud concludes.4 The 
separation rate at fraud firms is higher during and after the fraud period by 12% on average. 
Displaced workers are more likely to leave the industry and even the county, taking their next job 
(if any) elsewhere. The earnings drop and turnover is consistent with a story where workers are 
shocked by the fallout from the fraud and have lost firm-/industry-specific human capital, conduct 
job-search activities ineffectively, and/or enter crowded labor markets (e.g., Jacobson et al., 1993; 
Flaaen et al, 2018).  
We examine the heterogeneous consequences for employees at three different levels to better 
understand these wage effects: at the market, firm, and individual level. First, we separately 
examine “thin” and “thick” labor markets, i.e., regions with few and many industry-specific 
employers, respectively. The wage declines are much stronger in thin labor markets, indicating 
that much of the effect likely comes from limited opportunities, consistent with workers job 
hunting in relatively crowded labor markets (e.g., Moretti, 2011). Second, we show the effects for 
employees at firms which ultimately go into bankruptcy and not. While the magnitude is larger for 
the bankruptcy subsample, we continue to find significant wage drops for the non-bankruptcy 
                                                 
4  This result is generally consistent with evidence from Kedia and Philippon (2009) who use employee levels from 
Compustat. They find greater employee growth during the fraud period and interpret it as overinvestment in labor. 
With the change in employee mix during the fraud, this interpretation is not complete. The departure of existing 
employees could be a “brain drain” that requires more new employees to perform the same work. Kedia and 
Philippon (2009) also find higher employee growth before the fraud period. For our control firms, we match on 
pre-fraud employee growth. When using the same matching variables as Kedia and Philippon (2009), we replicate 
their result, and our inferences for the effects on wages and turnover are unaffected. 
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subsample, i.e., the effect is not isolated to employees of failed firms. Finally, we explore 
employee-level splits. These splits shed light on different mechanisms. Matched, leaving workers 
have negative wage effects, consistent with job search frictions for workers displaced by fraud 
(Christensen et al., 2005). Matched, early-leaving workers, i.e., those departing before the end of 
the fraud who are less likely to face job-search complications from fraud revelation, still 
experience declines in wages in the post-fraud period. Therefore, mechanisms other than labor 
market disruptions could have some effect on wages, such as workers suffer from the stigma 
associated with the fraud (e.g., Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Groysberg et al., 2017). Also, while 
executives are complicit and so are punished (e.g., Fama, 1980; Desai et al., 2006), we find that 
workers in the bottom 90% of the pre-fraud wage distribution (assumed not to be complicit 
executives) experience more negative wage effects during and after fraudulent financial reporting 
than the top 10% of employees., a novel result where consequences diverge from culpability. 
We make several important contributions. First, our paper contributes to an extensive 
literature documenting other consequences of fraudulent financial reporting. Some papers show 
specific actions taken by firms because of the misreporting (e.g., Erickson et al., 2004; McNichols 
and Stubben, 2008; Kedia and Philippon, 2009). Other papers document broader cost estimates 
(e.g., Karpoff et al., 2008; Dyck et al., 2013). Our analyses improve upon the findings from these 
papers by measuring the dynamics of employee turnover and wages at the employee level. We 
show that although overall employment outflow starts after the fraud, some workers are displaced 
even during the fraud, and we show that wages decline during and after the fraud. These findings 
are consistent with highly disruptive and costly illegal misreporting, even trickling down to 
employees. An important subset of this literature documents fraudulent financial reporting 
consequences for executives and directors (e.g., Srinivasan, 2005; Desai et al., 2006; Karpoff et 
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al., 2008a; Groysberg et al., 2017). We contribute to this literature by documenting that lower-
level employees suffer consequences similar to those at the top after the fraud is revealed, for 
example, higher incidence of job exits. This benchmark is important because low-level employees 
are rarely party to the fraud, whereas executives (directors) perpetrate (fail at their monitoring 
duties to uncover) the misreporting, so one might expect consequences for the latter to be more 
severe. 
Second, we contribute to another extensive literature documenting consequences for 
employees from a wide variety of shocks to firms (e.g., Gibbons and Katz, 1991; Jacobson et al., 
1993; Couch and Placzek, 2010; Walker, 2013; Autor et al., 2014; Hummels et al., 2014; Graham 
et al., 2016)5. Across these many shocks, such as layoffs, outsourcing, bankruptcy, regulation, and 
so on, the consequences for employees are significant in terms of wages and worker flows. We 
show complementary evidence for fraudulent financial reporting. However, the channels for fraud 
are distinct. During the fraud, executives bring in new workers, increasing headcount, while 
existing employees leave and experience wage decreases, plausibly a shift to keep the wage bill 
low. After revelation, employees are displaced and have negative wage effects across subsamples, 
including workers that change jobs before the revelation. This widespread negative wage effect is 
                                                 
5  There are papers—in addition to Graham et al. (2016)—that examine headcount, wages, and unemployment (risk) 
for workers at distressed firms (e.g., John et al., 1992; Agrawal and Matsa, 2013; Falato and Liang, 2016). We 
discuss these papers more in Section 2. Similar to our data and research questions, Graham et al. (2016) use the 
U.S. Census LEHD data to examine effects for employees rather than firms, so we compare our findings to theirs. 
We believe that it is important to differentiate distress and accounting fraud, though the two are related. Accounting 
fraud is distinctive because this corporate event entails information asymmetry, overemployment, and reputational 
damage. They can be related; for example, Schrand and Zechman (2012) discuss a pattern in the AAER data where 
executives use fraud to cover up distress. However, for other AAERs, “misreporting firms are indeed more 
optimistically biased; it is not the case that they are equally optimistic about earnings in expectation but the 
misreporting firms simply get a bad draw on earnings” (Schrand and Zechman, 2012, p. 313, emphasis added). As 
discussed above and in Sections 4.3 and 5.2, we match to a control sample on unmanaged revenue growth during 
the fraud period and examine the subsample of fraud firms that avoid bankruptcy, respectively. Worker wage results 
are similar to our main results in these tests and are less likely to be driven by firm distress. 
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plausibly a result of labor market disruptions and stigma from the fraud (e.g., Groysberg et al., 
2017). 
Third, our paper also has policy implications. We show labor market effects that can be useful 
inputs for evidence-based policymaking (Leuz, 2018). For example, regulatory reforms intended 
to reduce the burdens associated with mandatory financial reporting are often politically motivated 
by job creation. One case, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), reduced some 
disclosure and audit requirements for small and mid-sized IPO firms and was hailed by politicians 
for promoting job growth (Liberto, 2012), as evidenced by the tortured name that creates its 
acronym. In order to understand the total impact of such reforms, regulators need to consider both 
the capital market implications of such reforms, which are supposed to contribute to job growth, 
along with the labor market implications from a change in incentives to misreport. Our paper can 
contribute to that type of cost-benefit analysis while cautioning that there may be broader 
spillovers; we do not study undetected accounting fraud nor industry-wide effects. In addition, our 
finding that misreporting exacerbates labor market frictions could be considered alongside 
enterprise value to measure social costs of fraudulent financial reporting (e.g., Dyck et al., 2013). 
2. Literature Review and Mechanism Framework 
2.1. Literature Review 
We summarize four streams of literature, two mentioned in the introduction, (i) consequences 
of fraudulent financial reporting, (ii) consequences for employees from shocks to the firm, (iii) an 
important subset of (ii): consequences for employees from firm distress, and (iv) associations 
between worker characteristics and financial reporting quality. 
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One stream of literature has examined the broad consequences from accounting fraud for the 
firm and its peers. For instance, Erickson et al. (2004) show that firms incur real cash outflows to 
perpetuate fraud; namely, they overpay taxes. McNichols and Stubben (2008) show that firms 
overinvest in fixed assets, suggestive of internal information frictions. Kedia and Philippon (2009) 
show some effects related to ours with aggregated employee count and GAO restatement data. 
Kedia and Philippon (2009) also show overinvestment, consistent with McNichols and Stubben 
(2008), and have some evidence on increases in productivity after restatements. Beatty et al. (2013) 
investigate the spillover effects from high-profile accounting frauds on peers’ investment, which 
increases during the fraud period and could be facilitated by equity analysts. Li (2016) builds on 
Beatty et al. (2013) to show that these peer spillovers are more general, not confined to high-profile 
fraud and observable in many types of investment, e.g., R&D. Other papers document broader cost 
estimates; as mentioned in the introduction Karpoff et al. (2008b) find that firms lose about 29% 
of equity value. Of the measured decline, only 12% is expected legal penalties while 88% is a 
reputational penalty. Dyck et al. (2013) finds that firms lose about 22% of enterprise value. 
Academics also have documented the effects of fraudulent financial reporting for directors 
and executives, highly visible employees at the top of the firm. Early evidence from Agrawal et 
al. (1999) and Beneish (1999) suggested that firms suspected or charged with fraud did not have 
unusually high turnover among executives. Subsequent papers have documented significant career 
consequences for directors and executives. For restatements (not always fraud), Srinivasan (2005) 
finds in a three-year window that audit committee director turnover is 48% for firms that restate 
earnings downward and 33% for a performance-matched sample. Desai et al. (2006) find that 60% 
of restating firms turnover at least one top manager in a two-year window compared to 35% for 
matched firms. Karpoff et al. (2008a) examine SEC and Department of Justice enforcement actions 
9 
and find that 93% of identified executives lose their job, with some facing criminal charges and 
penalties that include jail time. In a concurrent working paper, Groysberg et al. (2017) a firm’s 
financial misconduct can affect pay for former executives not implicated in wrongdoing, which 
they attribute to “stigma,” defined by the authors as a discrediting attribute or associated with other 
discredited entities. For example, the attribute could be higher likelihood of poor job performance. 
Depending on specification, Groysberg et al. (2017) find that average pay is 4-6% lower for 
stigmatized executives in their panel. In contrast to these papers, our focus is on all employees and 
the heterogeneous effects of accounting fraud for different groups of employees. 
Prominent papers in labor economics document costs to employees and cross-sectional 
variation of mass layoffs. For example, Gibbons and Katz (1991) present a theoretical model of 
layoffs: when firms can choose whom to lay off, the demand-side of the labor market infers that 
laid-off workers are of low ability, i.e., “lemons.” They show evidence consistent with this among 
laid-off white-collar workers who experience about a 6%-9% wage decline, depending on 
specification. In their seminal paper, Jacobson et al. (1993) use administrative data from 
Pennsylvania to observe workers' wages in series; they find that high-tenure workers who separate 
from distressed firms suffer immediate (long-term) losses averaging 40% (25%) per year. 
Importantly for our analyses, they find that displaced workers' losses depend primarily on local 
labor-market conditions but not other worker attributes. More recently, Couch and Placzek (2010) 
revisit Jacobson et al.’s (1993) result due to concerns about magnitude estimates from a single, 
primarily industrial state during the 1970s and 80s. Couch and Placzek (2010) use administrative 
data from Connecticut and again find meaningful wage losses for displaced workers. They find 
that shortly after the separation, wages for workers displaced through mass layoff drop 
immediately (over the long-term, i.e., 6 years) 32% (12%) percent. 
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More recently, Walker (2013), Autor et al. (2014), and Hummels et al. (2014) examine the 
impact to employees from other shocks to firms, including environmental regulation, 
globalization, and offshoring, respectively. Walker (2013), estimating lost earnings from the Clean 
Air Act, finds affected workers lose, cumulatively, about 20% of their earnings on average. Autor 
et al. (2014) find that over 1992-2007, U.S. workers exposed to trade competition with China lose, 
again cumulatively, 46% of their earnings when moving across the inner quartile range. Finally, 
Hummels et al. (2014) examine the impact of offshoring on Danish workers’ earnings; the authors 
find that, as an estimated size, when a firm doubles its offshoring, unskilled workers can expect 
cumulative wage losses of about 12%. Skilled workers are not harmed and can even benefit while 
continuing to work for the firm. All three of these papers, and Couch and Placzek (2010), do find 
predictable cross-sectional effects, such as more harm to long-tenured workers, unlike Jacobson et 
al. (1993).  
One important stream of literature examines the labor market impact of firm distress, which 
can raise wages as employees demand premiums for risk associated with distress and thus affect 
firms’ decision-making. These papers often focus on financial distress or capital structure. An 
earlier paper that focuses on product market (rather than financial) distress and conditions the 
sample on recovery, John et al. (1992) show that firms very quickly shed about 5%-6% of their 
employees using levels data from Compustat. Using similar Compustat data, Whitaker (1999) 
shows that firms which take remedial actions, like cutting employees, during distress tend to 
recover. Their sample firms publicly announce that they are taking actions to recover from their 
poor performance, including reducing headcount. Agrawal and Matsa (2013) use changes to state-
level unemployment insurance laws to estimate that the indirect costs of financial distress 
associated with unemployment risk is equal to about 60 basis points of firm value (i.e., this is the 
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cost to firms of attracting and retaining workers due to employment assurance benefits offered by 
firm stability; Baily, 1974).6 Consistent with these employment costs to workers, Falato and Liang 
(2016) find that debt covenant violations are associated with 10% drops in headcount. An 
important benchmark for our paper is Graham et al. (2016), who also use the U.S. Census LEHD 
data; they find that distressed firms pay wage premiums of about 12% and that in the event of 
bankruptcy, employees see wages drop by about 10% and are below pre-bankruptcy levels for six 
years, at least. Finally, Brown and Matsa (2016) show that job seekers understand and respond to 
firms’ financial condition. As an employer’s distress increases, it receives fewer and lower quality 
applicants for posted jobs.7 Building on these labor economics and finance papers, our paper 
documents that excessive optimism or unsuccessfully hiding bad performance backfires on the 
firms’ employees due to misleading information, labor market disruptions, and stigmatization. 
Finally, we discuss recent papers that document associations between employee 
characteristics and financial reporting quality, including fraud. Call et al. (2016) show that firms 
grant more options to non-top executive employees during periods of fraudulent financial 
reporting, consistent with firms providing incentives that deter whistle-blowing. Call et al. (2017) 
associate reporting quality with the average workforce education level in MSAs where the firm is 
headquartered and locations disclosed in 10-Ks; they find that firms with measured high-quality 
workers negatively correlate with absolute abnormal accruals, have fewer internal control 
violations, and fewer restatements. The authors conclude that workers can have an impact on the 
                                                 
6  In a working paper, using Swedish data, Baghai et al. (2018) show that firms do worse retaining talented employees 
when distressed. The firm-level conclusions are similar to Agrawal and Matsa (2013), except with employer-
employee matched data: financial distress can be costly to the firm because employees value Baily (1974)-type 
insurance provided by the firm. 
7  Other recent papers could also provide benchmarks for our results including, for example, the spillover effects from 
bankruptcy (Bernstein et al., 2018) or employee outcomes from other, major corporate transactions (e.g., Davis et 
al., 2014; Lee et al., 2018; Agrawal and Tambe, 2019). Bankruptcy spillovers, private equity investments, and 
merger and acquisition are associated with net job and wage losses, but the latter two are also associated with 
productivity gains. 
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quality of financial reporting. There are also several working papers in this area. Hass et al. (2018) 
show that industry-level labor mobility is negatively related to regression-based estimates of real 
earnings management. These results suggest that worker mobility could “act as a disciplining 
mechanism discouraging firms from engaging in real earnings management.” More closely related 
to our paper, the authors also show that restatement incidence is negatively related to mobility.8 
Bai et al. (2018) use establishment-level US Census data to correlate disclosure quality and average 
wages for all employees. They document that firms with poorer disclosures pay their employees 
more both in the cross section and using SOX section 404 implementation as an instrument. In 
another concurrent working paper, Makridis and Zhou (2019) use Glassdoor employee ratings data 
to show that worker perceptions of firms decline during and after periods of misreporting. They 
also show some self-reported wage effects that appear to have a different time series pattern than 
ours. We contribute beyond these papers by using matched-firm and matched-individual samples, 
showing various labor market outcomes of current and former employees of accounting fraud firms 
and examining cross-sectional splits to provide evidence on mechanisms. Moreover, there is an 
emerging and rich literature associating financial reporting quality and social consequences to 
which our paper contributes.9 
2.2. A Framework for the Impact of Fraud on Labor Markets 
In this subsection, we propose a framework for the impact of fraud on labor markets, providing 
a structure to consider the connections between features of fraud and economic mechanisms that 
                                                 
8  While characteristics of the firm’s workforce, such as mobility, might influence likelihood to commit accounting 
fraud, we show at the employee level what happens to employees during and after periods of serious, fraudulent 
financial reporting. Moreover, we want to document consequences of fraud for employees, rather than equilibrium 
predictors of it. 
9  Another example, Holzman et al. (2019) document city crime spillover effects from fraudulent financial reporting. 
They show that financially motivated crime increases in cities where fraud firms are located, a consequence that 
could be related to our results of job turnover and lower wages. 
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impact workers. We discuss three features of accounting fraud and associate these features with 
five mechanisms that could affect labor costs for workers, specifically wages and turnover. We 
depict these associations graphically as Figure 1. 
Information Asymmetry 
A preeminent feature of fraudulent financial reporting is that executives (or other perpetrators) 
are falsifying public information about the firm, which often shows better performance than the 
underlying economics. If workers keep or take a job in the presence of these informational 
asymmetries, they are misled about the likelihood of suffering a negative shock in the future. For 
example, if the firm does not improve under cover of the fraud and the fraud is revealed, employees 
only learn then that the firm has worse prospects compared to what had been falsely reported. 
Otherwise with accurate information about less optimistic or poor performance at the firm, 
employees might switch to or take a different job elsewhere (Brown and Matsa, 2016). For 
example, executives may use accounting fraud to defer the employee costs associated with 
financial distress (e.g., Agrawal and Matsa, 2013). Alternatively, fraud firms could be 
optimistically biased (i.e., not receiving a bad draw on earnings, as pointed out by Schrand and 
Zechman, 2012), and the employees could then be shocked by corrective actions (discussed more 
below) taken by the firm to reign in this bias. After a fraud is revealed, a theoretical explanation 
for displacement and lower wages is that employees cannot perform a thorough job search 
(Christensen et al., 2005). That is, they experience job-search frictions—on the job or after 
involuntary displacement—and so receive lower wages at their next jobs (e.g., Mincer, 1986; 
Addison and Portugal, 1989). 
Overemployment: Hiring and Turnover Decisions 
14 
Executives in accounting-fraud firms appear to overinvest in capital and may also over-hire 
employees in order to bolster the perception of the firm (McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Kedia and 
Philippon, 2009). This overinvestment would affect workers through two mechanisms. First, when 
employees work for a firm, they accumulate firm- (and industry-) specific human capital (Becker 
1993). This specific capital loses value when the worker is displaced, which will happen when 
overinvestment is unwound.10 Second, due to overinvestment at the fraud firm or in the fraud 
firm’s industry (e.g., Beatty et al., 2013), workers with similar skills are likely to lose jobs at the 
same time. Workers will be searching for their next job in an unfavorable local labor market 
condition: the labor market will be “crowded,” i.e., many, similar workers will be looking for a 
job at the same time. Unwinding overinvestment would cause displacement. And both of these 
mechanisms, conditional on displacement, would be costly to workers in terms of wages. Similar 
effects have been shown in non-fraud settings (e.g., Jacobson et al., 1993; Couch and Placzek, 
2010). These wage losses vary with tenure, mass layoffs, and local labor market conditions in ways 
consistent with firm-specific human capital and crowded labor markets. 
Misconduct 
A final feature of fraud is that a person or group of people commit an illegal act; if caught, the 
perpetrator(s) will be punished by both the legal system and the labor market (Fama, 1980). Prior 
literature has examined the incentives to commit fraud. Executives’ private benefits and their 
narcissism or willingness to cover up problems can trigger accounting fraud (e.g., Beneish, 1999; 
Armstrong et al., 2010; Ham et al., 2017). Kedia and Philippon (2009) demonstrate that executives 
engage in both accounting fraud and insider trading for their private benefits. Schrand and 
                                                 
10  Incomplete information about employer-employee matching quality generates earnings losses for switching 
workers as well; employees lose the informational value of firm-specific matching quality when displaced 
(Jovanovic, 1979). 
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Zechman (2012) find that an executive’s excessive optimism can result in accounting fraud. Also, 
as discussed above, prior literature has examined the labor market consequences of accounting 
fraud for those at the very top of the firm: e.g., observable executives like the CEO or directors 
(Srinivasan, 2005; Karpoff et al., 2008a). For example, Desai et al. (2006) find that executives 
experience turnover and poor job prospects. Moreover, to the extent that we have culpable 
individuals in our analysis, the punitive effects should match what prior literature has documented. 
The reputational damage from the misconduct of accounting fraud can also spill over to employees 
that were not involved. A fraud firm’s bad reputation could negatively affect employees in the 
labor market through “stigma” (Groysberg et al., 2017). This stigma could also affect lower level 
employees that still rely on the reputation of former employers when seeking out a job or 
bargaining for wages. 
3. Data and Research Design 
3.1. Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases 
Our sample for fraudulent financial reporting are the enforcement actions taken by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Specifically, we use Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs). This sample identifies cases of accounting problems (among 
other enforcement actions taken by the SEC) that can be connected with prosecutable, fraudulent 
behavior by executives (Schrand and Zechman, 2012). We use UC Berkeley CFRM’s dataset. 
Many prior papers have used these enforcement actions across a range of topics, for instance, to 
estimate, describe, and measure effects of fraudulent financial reporting (e.g., Feroz et al., 1991; 
Beneish, 1999; Farber, 2005; Dechow et al., 2011; Groysberg et al., 2017). 
16 
Using the AAER sample involves a tradeoff where Type I errors for identified misreporting 
are very low but sample size tends to be small and spread out over many years (Dechow et al., 
2010). 11 The small sample size is less costly for this study because we use worker-years as the 
unit of analysis, increasing power. In addition, the long time series data mitigate a concern that our 
findings may be attributable only to specific time periods. Another tradeoff is that SEC 
enforcement priorities drive AAERs. Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) find that the SEC pursues cases 
at firms closer to the SEC and with higher media attention to be most effective with limited 
resources. In other words, the SEC could pursue more impactful cases because of resource 
constraints. These priorities may bias our results, measuring a larger impact, compared with the 
average accounting fraud. Finally, Karpoff et al. (2017) indicate CFRM data perform relatively 
well (i.e., see their Table 8) across a variety of metrics, except in measurement of the timing when 
stock market participants learn about the misreporting, though not in measuring the dates of 
misreporting periods. To overcome this challenge, we assume that misreporting is revealed to the 
public in a subsequent year to the misreporting period. This assumption is consistent with the 
finding of Karpoff et al. (2017) that stock market participants learn about the misreporting in about 
two months after the misreporting period on average. 
3.2. U.S. Census data 
We combine this AAER data with worker-firm matched data from the U.S. Census Bureau 
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) and Longitudinal Business Database 
(LBD) data. 
                                                 
11  Karpoff et al. (2017) echo some of these concerns with using AAER data. Our interest is in serious misreporting to 
measure the consequences for employees. We believe that AAERs match the data to the research question, 
consistent with Karpoff et al.’s (2017) recommendation to be careful with such matching. 
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The LEHD data have a comprehensive coverage of workers, on average covering 96% of all 
private-sector jobs across years (e.g., Abowd et al., 2005). We have data from 23 states 
participating in the LEHD program. These data include wage data when the earnings are covered 
by a state’s unemployment insurance program and generally include salaries, bonuses, equity, tips, 
and other perquisites (e.g., meals, housing, and retirement contributions, among others) (BLS, 
2016). We observe these earnings as quarterly and annual pay. Self-employed, unemployed, and 
workers who move to non-participating states are not observable in the LEHD data. The data allow 
us to track the wages of workers who were employed at accounting-fraud firms but have since 
moved to other firms. We also use the individual characteristics provided by the LEHD data to 
separate the effects of misreporting and employee characteristics (e.g., gender, education, and 
experience) on wages. We require that employees are between 20 and 55 years old during the fraud 
period; this requirement generally limits the sample to workers who are (or desire to be) full-time 
participants in the workforce. We also require that the worker’s annual real wages are higher than 
$2,000 to exclude temporary workers. 
The LBD data contain aggregated, establishment-level information (e.g., Davis et al., 2014; 
Giroud and Mueller, 2017). It covers the universe of non-farm industries from across the United 
States. The data come from the IRS and include variables such as wage bill and employment. We 
use these data to track employee growth within a misreporting firm over pre-fraud, fraud, and post-
fraud periods.12  
                                                 
12  The Compustat-SSEL Bridge (CSB) (covering 1981-2005) and the Standard Statistical Establishment List (SSEL) 
(covering later years) use primarily CUSIPs to link Compustat to LBD. We supplement these links by matching 
Employer Identification Numbers and company name, address, and industry in both data. We merge the 
Computstat-LBD data with the LEHD files using the Employer Characteristics Files (ECF). These linking files are 
widely used in prior literature (e.g., Graham et al., 2016; Giroud and Mueller, 2017). Finally, we merge with CFRM 
using CIKs (current and historical). 
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3.3. Research design and matching 
Our research design allows measurement of effects from fraud to be dynamic over the 
misreporting’s lifecycle. We treat the misreporting as having three distinct periods. (i) “Pre-fraud” 
is the four-year period prior to the beginning of the fraudulent misreporting. (ii) “Fraud” is the 
period of time that mandatory financial information has been seriously misreported, later drawing 
SEC scrutiny, normalized to a maximum of three years. And (iii) “post-fraud” is the six-year period 
after the fraud is terminated, either through manager discontinuation, revelation, and/or firm 
failure. Although many accounting frauds are likely to be much more complex than a simple three-
period event, we believe this categorization has several advantages. First, a common baseline in 
the pre-fraud period will help us select a plausible control sample to map out effects of the 
accounting fraud over later periods. Second, we are able to use the effects across multiple periods 
and subsamples to provide some evidence on various stories that may drive the results. Third, this 
research design is consistent with prior papers that examine firm actions during and after 
misreporting events (e.g., McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Kedia and Philippon, 2009).13 For most 
analyses, we examine existing employees, i.e., those employed in the pre-fraud period; though, we 
also use a sample of new employees, i.e., those hired during the fraud period, to show cross-
sectional effects. 
We primarily use a matched sample of fraud and non-fraud firms to control for firm 
fundamentals because we are interested in the impact of accounting fraud, instead of firm 
                                                 
13  McNichols and Stubben (2008) map out separate effects for the three years leading up to the misreporting, the first 
three years of misreporting (truncating later years), and the three years after misreporting. Kedia and Philippon 
(2009) measure average effects (i.e., combined) for the two years leading up to the restated period, all restated 
years, and the two years after the restated period. We use the disaggregated approach. In untabulated analyses, the 
“combined years” approach yields similar results. We normalize the fraud period to three years by counting 
subsequent years as additional “third years” to avoid separately identifying any fraud firms with descriptive data 
(i.e., long-lasting frauds) to comply with Census Bureau requirements. 
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performance, on labor markets. When examining wages, we require that these firms be covered by 
the LEHD data (i.e., these firms will have at least one employee hired before fraud periods and 
one employee hired during fraud periods in one of the 23 states). We perform a propensity score 
match within industry-year, using 2-digit SIC industry codes from the firm-year prior to the 
AAER-identified misreporting. We match fraud firms’ to non-fraud firms’ characteristics in the 
year prior to the AAER-identified misreporting because fraud and non-fraud firms make different 
real decisions, such as investment, during a fraud period (e.g., McNichols and Stubben, 2008). We 
estimate the following cross-sectional probit model on the CFRM-Compustat-LBD-LEHD sample 
to obtain firm-year scores to match fraud to non-fraud firms: 
Fraud-Firm Indicatori,t-1 = β0 + β1 × Sizei,t-1 + β2 × Return on Assetsi,t-1 + β3 × Leveragei,t-1 +  
β4 × Tobin’s Qi,t-1 + β5 × Employee Growthi,t-1 + εi,t-1. (1) 
We give definitions in the Appendix Table A, and index firm with i and fraud event-time with 
t. In Appendix Table B, we report the results of the probit model. Consistent with prior literature 
that matches on Size (e.g., Farber, 2005; Schrand and Zechman, 2012) and Tobin’s Q significantly 
and positively correlate with Fraud-Firm Indicator. Return on Assets and Employee Growth also 
positively correlate with Fraud-Firm Indicator. We include Leverage and Employee Growth in 
the model because prior papers indicate that these variables are correlated with employee wages 
and employee composition (Berk et al., 2010; Chemmaunur et al., 2013; Ouimet and Zarutskie, 
2014) 
Our main empirical tests use all observable employees from the fraud and non-fraud firm in 
our matched sample. We estimate wage effects, scaling wages using the CPI to 2010 price 
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levels. 14 We estimate the following statistical specification characterizing workers’ wages 
depending on work history (this is an unbalanced worker-year panel): 
Ln(Annual Real Wagesj,τ) = α + β1,p× ∑p=1,2,3,4 Pre(t-p)j,τ + β2,p × ∑p=0,1,2 Fraud(t+p)j,τ +  
β3,p × ∑p=3,4,5,6,7,8 Post(t+p)j,τ  + β4,p× Fraud Ind.j × ∑p=1,2,3,4 Pre(t-p)j,τ +  
β5,p × Fraud Ind.j × ∑p=0,1,2 Fraud(t+p)j,τ + β6,p × Fraud Ind.j × ∑p=3,4,5,6,7,8 Post(t+p)j,τ  +  
∑ βm Worker Controlsj,τ + ∑ βk Fixed Effectsj,τ + εj,τ. (2) 
We index worker with j and calendar year with τ. Fraud periods vary in calendar time 
depending on the worker. Worker controls include interactions of Female Indicator, Education, 
and Experience; the main effects are collinear with the fixed effects (e.g., Topel, 1991).15 In all 
specifications, we include worker and year fixed effects. We interact industry (and county) fixed 
effects with the year effects in some specifications. These controls generally follow Graham et al. 
(2016) and control for determinants of wages that could depend on the composition of the fraud 
and control firms’ workforce and regional, industry-specific shocks. The period indicators nearly 
span the sample; we follow Graham et al. (2016) and have the baseline period be the two years 
prior to the Pre(t-4). We provide a detailed timeline in Figure 2 that map out these period 
indicators. 
This specification is a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effects of fraudulent 
financial reporting. β4 is estimated wages for workers at fraud firms incremental to those at control 
firms prior to the misreporting. If the matches are reasonably well chosen, we expect the estimated 
                                                 
14  When the data are missing, we do not infer zero wages. This measurement choice underestimates the costs of some 
job switches because we do not include the zeros for workers with long unemployment spells. An example where 
the worker is missing but does not have zero wages is a worker that has moved to another state not part of our data. 
15  Experience is collinear with the main effects for the fraud periods (when measured as event-time year indicators), 
and we exclude this main effect from those specifications; that is, when Experience is demeaned by worker, it is 
effectively equivalent to a sequential count of the number of years in our sample. 
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coefficient to be insignificantly different from zero and not exhibit any pre-fraud period trends. β5 
measures the incremental wages of fraud-firm employees for the fraud period. This measure is our 
first coefficient of interest; we infer the consequences for employees during the fraud from this 
coefficient estimate. β6 measures the incremental wages for employees of fraud firms during the 
post-fraud period. This measure is our second coefficient of interest; we infer the consequences 
for employees after the fraud from the coefficient estimate. The identifying assumption for both 
of these coefficients is that wages would have evolved (in the absence of fraudulent financial 
reporting) for employees of AAER firms during and after the fraud as wages have evolved for 
control-firm employees. 
Besides examining wages, we also map out employment growth in the pre, during, and post 
fraud periods from LBD data to measure firm-wide effects. This measure indicates dynamic job 
creation (destruction) across our three periods of fraud. We draw similar inferences from 
untabulated tests using Compustat and LEHD employment data. LBD data only counts U.S. 
employees; Compustat counts worldwide employees. LEHD data only counts employees in 
participating states. 
4. Main analyses 
4.1. Sample description 
Table 1 Panel A provides comparisons of our matched fraud and non-fraud (control) firms. 
We find that our matching process described in section 3.3 generates a reasonably well-balanced 
sample. We perform the matching and measure these differences in the last year of the pre-fraud 
period. For the main tests, we match one-to-one on a firm basis but not an employee basis to focus 
on the effect of corporate events on employees, so matched firms with different numbers of 
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employees would result in a larger treatment or control employee sample. In total, our sample 
contains about 200 fraud and 200 control firms. We do not find significant differences between 
fraud and control firms when comparing any of the control variables including Size, Assets, Return 
on Assets, Leverage, Tobin’s Q, and Employee Growth.16 The average, firm-wide annual wages 
are comparable for fraud and matched control firms and equal to about $54 or $55 thousand 
normalized to 2010 CPI price levels.17 
We show dynamics of employee growth over the life cycle of the pre-fraud, fraud, and post-
fraud periods. In Figure 3, we present the trend of fraud firms’ employment decisions measured as 
year-on-year employee growth; we include growth at control firms for comparison. Compared 
with this control sample, we find positive employee growth among fraud firms in the fraud period; 
we see very high growth in both Fraud(t) and Fraud(t+1). Absolute (incremental) employee 
growth rises to 19% (9%) in the first year of the fraud then dips as the fraud continues in subsequent 
years. In the post-fraud period, we observe negative employee growth; the differences are 
meaningful for some years after the fraud ends, Post(t+4), Post(t+5), Post(t+6), and Post(t+7) 
have estimates of -3%, -5%, -4%, and -3%, respectively.  
Table 1 Panel B gives descriptive statistics of firm characteristics for fraud firms with LEHD 
data, i.e., our sample, and all fraud firms with Compustat data. Firms with employees in more 
states have a higher likelihood of entering the LEHD data, so we expect our sample to contain 
                                                 
16 Our matching model uses employee growth; consequently, there are statistically insignificant differences between 
fraud and matched-control firms in growth prior to the fraud period. This descriptive statistic differs from Kedia 
and Philippon (2009), who use employee levels from Compustat and do not match on employee growth. They find 
greater employee growth before the fraud period. When using the same matching variables as Kedia and Philippon 
(2009), we replicate their employment level results; our other main findings are not affected by this design choice. 
17  Individual data that enter our sample have wages $10 to $20 thousand greater than these firm-wide average. One 
potential reason is that our main sample focuses on existing employees with two years of work experience at the 
firm, not all employees including both existing, new, and temporary employees as in the LBD data. 
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larger and more mature firms. This is consistent with the relative magnitudes signed differences 
from Table 1 Panel B. Specifically, our sample fraud firms are larger, more profitable, have lower 
leverage, and have lower growth prospects. These differences are comparable to similar matching 
outcomes from prior literature (e.g., Table 1 Panel B in Graham et al., 2016).18  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the individual characteristics of employees of fraud 
and control firms. We construct our sample with existing employees to be included in tests, we 
require that she work for the sample firm in the two years prior to the fraud period, that is, Pre(t-
2) and Pre(t-1). These data (and calculated differences) are from the last year of the pre-fraud 
period, Pre(t-1). At fraud firms, employees have similar education and gender. The annual real 
wage for individual workers in our sample is equal to about $73 thousand at fraud firms ($65 
thousand at control firms). This is about 13% higher for our sample employees at fraud firms than 
matched control firm employees; although, this difference is not statistically significant. 
Employees at fraud firms are older by a year and a half and, consequently, have more experience.19 
These two variables are highly related, so perhaps it is not surprising that these differences have 
similar magnitudes. 
4.2. Results for wages and displacement 
Table 3 contains our main result. We find consistently negative wage effects in the fraud and 
post-fraud periods for employees who work(ed) at fraud firms. We test for dynamic wage effects 
                                                 
18 These differences indicate we may have some limitations to the generalizability of our results because fraud at larger 
firms could be wider reaching and, consequently, have a greater aggregate effect for employees. On the other hand, 
larger firms could be more durable and absorb shocks, mitigating effects for employees. 
19  In a robustness test, we match employees at fraud firms with employees at non-fraud firms using individual 
characteristics including, e.g., age and education. One concern of our main research design might be that employees 
working for fraud firms are different from employees working for non-fraud firms. By controlling for individual 
characteristics, we compare similar workers: one happens to work for fraud firms and the other happens to work 
for non-fraud firms.  
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during and after fraudulent financial reporting to see the consequences for employees. Across 
columns, we increase the number of fixed effects. Specifically, in columns 1, 2, and 3, we estimate 
models with worker effects and year effects, year-industry, and year-industry-county effects, 
respectively. In column 1, we observe that employees in the pre-fraud period have negative wage 
changes compared with workers at non-fraud firms. The significance of this pre-fraud-period 
difference attenuates statistically in columns 2 and 3. We note that the magnitude of the wage 
drops from Pre(t-1) and Fraud(t) is consistent across columns, ranging between 6% and 8%. Also, 
the average magnitudes for the post-fraud period are more negative than for the fraud period by 
1% to 2%. That is, the negative wage effect becomes more negative in event-time. Finally, the 
average wage effects in the fraud and post fraud periods are meaningfully negative, equal to about 
-16%, -13%, and -9% in columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively. To get a better sense of the trends, we 
depict column 3 graphically in Figure 4 with confidence interval estimates. 
The magnitudes of the coefficients attenuate as additional effects are included, but the 
negative consequences are robust across different specifications. For example, the coefficients in 
column 3 are less negative than in column 2. This latter descriptive fact is consistent with both (i) 
frauds occurring and being revealed during (regional,) industry shocks and (ii) frauds being related 
to industry (and/or regional) spillovers (Beatty et al., 2013) and local labor market disruptions. The 
specification in column 2 controls for industry shocks, and the specification in column 3 controls 
for regional, industry shocks. In column 3, we remove the 24 thousand observations that are 
singletons from the sample. However, the wage drop is robust to these different specifications. 
In Table 3, we also examine evidence for common trends using the first four coefficient 
estimates. We find that column 3 depicts small, insignificant coefficient estimates in the pre-fraud 
period without a consistent negative / positive sign, whereas coefficients for the fraud and post-
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fraud periods are negative and significant for all interacted indicators. In the first two columns, we 
observe some evidence that wage decreases pre-date the fraud period. The three later years (last 
year) of the pre-fraud period, Pre(t-3), Pre(t-2), and Pre(t-1) (only Pre(t-1)), has a negative 
coefficient that is significant at p = 0.1 threshold in column 1 (column 2). Otherwise, the estimated 
coefficients for the pre-fraud period are not significant (though negative). Overall, these tests 
indicate that the final set of controls removes much of the variation from local shocks that could 
pre-date the fraud.20 When controlling for these explanations, the onset of negative wage effects 
are relatively sharp and start around the fraud period for employees. We continue to use the 
specification with year-industry-county effects elsewhere in our analyses. 
Next, we examine displacement. From the firm’s perspective, there are three, straightforward 
reasons which explain why firms will use less labor in post-fraud periods. First, conditional on 
excess hiring during the fraud period, firms will reduce this inefficient hiring when the fraud 
concludes (Kedia and Philippon, 2009). Second, accounting fraud indicates some governance 
failure at the firm. Afterward, boards or shareholders could take away decision rights from 
executives and undertake projects with more caution, causing use of employee labor (and other 
inputs) to contract (Farber, 2005). Third, Schrand and Zechman (2012) show that excessive 
optimism (covering up small shocks) tends to precede fraud, which can unravel afterward if the 
shock worsens. Naturally, a firm’s use of labor will decline with a negative shock, especially when 
the shock causes the firm to fail. Each of these effects would likely cause worker displacements as 
the firm contracts in the post-fraud period. 
                                                 
20  Specifications that similarly include some combination of year, industry, and county effects do not have significant 
coefficient estimates among the pre-fraud indicators. For instance, (untabulated) a specification with year, industry, 
and county effects or year-industry and year-county effects have comparable results to column 3, though with 
consistently negative pre-fraud coefficient estimates that are not significant at conventional levels. 
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In Table 4, we demonstrate that employees of fraud firms are more likely to leave a firm, an 
industry, and a county during or after fraud periods. We measure employee-level attrition in the 
first year of the fraud, Fraud(t), and the third and sixth years of the post-fraud period, Post(t+5) 
and Post(t+8). We generate dummy variables that indicate whether an employee stays working (i) 
at the firm, (ii) in the industry, or (iii) in the county. For industry and county, we indicate with the 
industry and location of the employee’s next job.21 We present the averages for these dummies for 
employees of fraud firms in columns 1 and non-fraud firms in column 2. Employee attrition from 
the firm, industry, and county is high: these two-year tenured employees leave the non-fraud firms 
in the first year at rates of 9%, 9%, and 12%, respectively. The existing employees of fraud firms 
are more likely to leave in the fraud year by 3.5%. Attrition from the fraud firm industry also 
appears to have a larger magnitude but this difference is not significant. Fraud firm employees do 
not incrementally leave the county for their next job. This displacement contrasts sharply with the 
results from Figure 3, where we saw higher employee growth at fraud firms. These two findings 
suggest that fraud firms are substituting new employees for long-tenured employees, changing the 
worker composition. If existing employees are more expensive than newly hired employees, 
executives plausibly engineer this composition change to show headcount growth and keep the 
wage bill low.22 The new employees may join because this fraud prevents them from realizing that 
                                                 
21  If the worker has a subsequent, missing observation, we consider them to have left the firm, industry, and county. 
The “stay” county-level measure is biased downward if the worker stays unemployed in the same county. 
Alternatively, it could be that the worker leaves the county to a state that is not in our sample in order to stay at the 
same firm or in the same industry. So, we may underestimate “stays” for firm and industry. 
22  McNichols and Stubben (2008) find overinvestment in capital expenditures but find weaker overinvestment with 
R&D expenditures. They suggest that R&D reduces profits immediately, making it a less attractive type of 
investment to improve firm performance while perpetrating fraud. Employee wages are similar to R&D: 
overinvestment in labor would be expensed presently. Shifting the worker composition toward cheaper, new 
employees could cause the firm to have the appearance of growth without the income statement expense. 
Alternatively, some employees may leave when it becomes apparent that the firm is experiencing a shock even 
though executives are attempting to hide this bad news with fraudulent financial reporting. 
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the performance is worse than reported (Brown and Matsa, 2016).23 In both post fraud periods that 
we measure, existing employees of fraud firms are much more likely to be displaced, switching 
industries or moving her location to find new employment after the fraud, a costly, negative 
consequence related to fraudulent financial reporting. This result in the accounting fraud setting 
contrasts with the finding of Caggese et al. (2018) who examine a setting of financially constrained 
firms in Sweden. Different from increasing the proportion of new employees as fraud firms do in 
our sample, their sample firms fire new workers instead of existing workers. Caggese et al. (2018) 
interpret this as sub-optimal due to a distortion in the trade-off between current costs and future 
benefits to productivity of new workers. 
We descriptively split the result by fraud employee movements to understand the source of 
these wage changes. We separate wage effects in the pre-fraud, fraud, and post-fraud periods for 
fraud-firm employees who (i) stay through at least three years in the post-fraud period (“stayer”), 
(ii) leave in the first year of the fraud period (“early leaver”), and (iii) leave after the first year of 
the fraud period but before three years in the post-fraud period (“late leaver”). We compare these 
subsamples with the average wage effects for workers at non-fraud firms. These results are 
descriptive because average wages for control workers include changes from regular job churn. 
So, we caution that workers conditioned on maintaining job status likely have other inherent 
differences (e.g., reliability) that can be consistent with higher wages or positive wage trends. 
However, these analyses help us understand where the negative wage effects occur, coinciding 
with displacements. In subsequent analyses (see Section 4.3), we also condition the control 
employees for staying or leaving the non-fraud firms. 
                                                 
23  Another interpretation is that workers are able to identify that the firm is misreporting / has higher risks, so worker 
composition is changing to reflect the risk preferences of the employees (e.g., similar to the endogenous matching 
as shown with worker and firm age by Ouimet and Zarutskie (2014)). 
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Figure 5 shows the results separated for fraud-firm-employee movements. We find that 
leavers experience most of the negative wage effects during both the fraud and post-fraud periods. 
The earnings drop and turnover is consistent with a story where workers are shocked by the fallout 
from the fraud and have lost firm-/industry-specific human capital, conduct job-search activities 
ineffectively, and/or enter crowded labor markets (e.g., Jacobson et al., 1993; Flaaen et al, 2018). 
Compared with the average control-firm worker, stayers have positive wage trends in the fraud 
and first three post-fraud years. When we stop conditioning on stayers’ employment with the fraud 
firm, their pay returns to similar trends as all non-fraud, control employees. We show an interesting 
dynamic for fraud-firm employees who are early versus late leavers. Early leavers experience 
negative wage effects during the fraud period (i.e., when they leave the fraud firm) but afterward 
experience a recovery of wages. Late leavers, on the other hand, have negative wage effects in 
both the fraud and post-fraud periods, which is consistent with accounting fraud revelation causing 
disruption to local labor markets. These negative wage effects for late leavers are persistent 
through the end of the event-time series. 
4.3. Robustness 
As discussed above, our main sample uses one-to-one matches of firms in the year prior to 
fraud. We indicate our reasons for using the year prior, such as not ruling out effects from 
concurrent real decisions, etc. One concern with this design is that firms experience shocks that 
both (a) influence the executive’s probability to fraudulently misreport performance and (b) affect 
the ability of the firm to maintain headcount and wages. Moreover, fraudulent financial reporting 
could be the executive’s response to exogenous firm distress (Schrand and Zechman, 2012). If 
executives anticipate that firm distress would be compounded by employees demanding wage 
premiums (e.g., Agrawal and Matsa, 2013; Graham et al., 2016), they may attempt to defer these 
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costs by hiding the distress from employees with accounting fraud. So, the concern about negative 
shocks could be compounded by this response from the executives. 
In a robustness test, we vary the control sample in response to this concern. We match firms 
using hand-collected firm data from the fraud period to control for temporal shocks. We separate 
the fraud sample into revenue misreporting and non-revenue misreporting. For the revenue 
misreporting subsample, we gather unmanaged sales data from, in order: (i) differences between 
Compustat-Snapshot “As First Reported - Annual” and “Most Recently Restated - Annual”, (ii) 
AAER reported annual misstatement amounts, (iii) restatements on SEC EDGAR database, and 
(iv) a Factiva and Google search for archival news documents reporting on the fraud. We use this 
hand-collected data to construct a Sales Growth variable measured from Pre(t-1) to Fraud(t) and 
include this variable in our propensity-score-matching model along with the other variables noted 
in equation (1). We estimate our main specification with this alternative control sample, including 
year-industry-county effects among other controls. We present the results in Table 5, column 1. 
The main findings are consistent using this alternative control sample. One coefficient, the estimate 
for incremental wages for fraud firm employees in period Fraud(t+1) is no longer significant at 
conventional levels. The magnitude decline in wages for this robustness test across fraud and post 
fraud period is about -9.6%, larger than the comparable specification for our main result. 
Another concern with the main design is that fraud firms have a unique composition of 
workers that will have different wage trends during and after a fraud event. We use the employee 
characteristics data from the LEHD to match subsamples of employees from our matched fraud 
and control firms. We one-to-one match employees on age, education, experience, gender, and 
pre-fraud wage decile without replacement. Again, we estimate our main specification, including 
year-industry-county effects among other controls and present the results in Table 5, column 2. In 
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performing this subsample match, we lose 6.46 million employee-year observations (71% of our 
main sample), partially a consequence of the employee size differences between fraud and matched 
control firms shown in Table 2. The findings are weaker than our main result. While all negative, 
only coefficients for periods Fraud(t+2) and Post(t+5) are significant at conventional levels. In 
addition, this subsample exhibits pre-trends where employees of fraud firms earn more in Pre(t-2) 
and Pre(t-1) compared to the control employees. The magnitude decline in wages for this test 
across the fraud and post fraud periods is about –3.7%. If we compare the wage drop in the fraud 
period to the averages at Pre(t-1), the magnitude is similar or larger than the wage declines from 
Table 3 (i.e., the main result: unmatched employees at matched firms). In other untabulated 
robustness tests, we match fraud firm employees to random employees within industry and 
characteristic-matched employees within industry at otherwise unmatched firms. The results of 
these alternative control groups are similar to our main results, with significant and negative wage 
effects in the fraud and post fraud periods. 
5. Heterogeneity across the Markets, Firms, and Workers 
5.1. Market Heterogeneity: Thick and Thin Markets 
To understand better the source of these wage changes, we descriptively split the result by the 
character of the market where the employee works. Moretti (2011), in reviewing local labor 
markets, points out that thick labor markets provide insurance to workers (and firms) against 
idiosyncratic shocks. He writes, “The presence of a large number of other employers implies a 
lower probability of not finding another job.” This intuitive logic resonates in fraud cases that are 
particularly harmful to small communities like how the WorldCom’s fraud affected Clinton, MS 
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(e.g., Noguchi, 2002). We expect the consequences of these frauds in thin labor markets to be 
particularly devastating for workers who do not have many other employer options. 
We separately examine “thick” and “thin” labor markets, i.e., regions with many and few 
industry-specific employers, respectively. Table 6 shows this sample split in columns 1 and 2. In 
column 1, we present estimates where the local labor market has many industry-specific 
employers, i.e., thick labor markets. Leading up to the fraud, fraud firms tend to give higher wages 
compared with the matched sample, Pre(t-2) and Pre(t-1) have coefficient estimates indicating 6% 
and 8% higher wages, respectively.24 This difference vanishes in the fraud period; wages start to 
trend downward. In the post fraud period, the fraud firms in thick labor markets pay less than the 
control firms but the estimates are not statistically significant, despite ranging between 6% and 
9%. The Post(t+5) coefficient is significant at the 10% level. In column 2, we present estimates 
where the local labor market has few industry specific employers, i.e., thin labor markets. 
Employees in these labor markets do very poorly. There are lower wage trends leading into the 
fraud period. The negative wage effects in the fraud and post fraud periods are large, e.g., point 
estimates more negative than -13% for almost all coefficients. We map out these effects in Figure 
6 Panel A. Overall, the wage declines are much stronger in thin labor markets, indicating that much 
of the effect likely comes from displacement into crowded labor markets and frictions to effective 
job-searches (e.g., Moretti, 2011). 
                                                 
24  Fraud firms in thick labor markets appear to have positive pre-fraud period trends which then reverse. This sample 
split could be correlated with the type of fraud firm. For example, these firms plausibly are in more competitive 
product markets and so are differentially paying employees due to the economics of these product markets, like 
increasing compensation for employees to aggressively increase sales. 
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5.2. Firm Heterogeneity: Bankruptcy and Non-Bankruptcy 
Another source of variation that is relevant for understanding the consequences for employees 
is the seriousness of the fraud or seriousness of the shock that the fraud is hiding. The seriousness 
of the fraud is related to the magnitude of the consequences in other settings; for example, 
Srinivasan (2005) finds that as the magnitude or duration of restatements increases, outside 
directors on the audit committee are more likely to turnover. Related, many big frauds can be 
associated with firm failure, e.g., Enron in late 2001 and early 2002 (SEC, 2004). In addition, 
Graham et al. (2016) examine the wage effects of bankruptcy (independent of fraudulent reporting) 
and find negative consequences for employees in the post-bankruptcy period. We want to both (i) 
see if the consequences vary with seriousness of the fraudulent misreporting and (ii) determine 
whether serious firm distress or firm failure can fully explain our results. 
To provide evidence on this variation, we examine bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy fraud 
firms. Bankruptcy firms likely receive a series of shocks or very severe shocks. Non-bankruptcy 
firms could be the other explanations: unwinding excesses from executive optimism or 
governance-driven contractions. For this subsample analysis, we retain the matched-control firm 
for bankrupt and non-bankrupt fraud firms; that is, the control firms are not divided on subsequent, 
bankrupt status. Table 6 shows this sample split in columns 3 and 4. The trends in both columns 
in the pre-fraud period are not significantly different from zero. In column 3, we present estimates 
where the fraud firm declares bankruptcy within three years after the fraud period. Employees of 
bankrupt fraud firms have only small declines in wages in Fraud(t). Subsequently, there is a sharp 
drop in wages. The magnitudes in the post fraud period range between -27% and -17%, recovering 
in the later years. Wage drops for employees of bankrupt fraud firms is severe. We can compare 
these magnitudes to Graham et al. (2016) who examine the wage effects of bankruptcy 
33 
(independent of fraudulent reporting). They find that wages deteriorate by 10% when a firm files 
for bankruptcy. As a rough comparison, the wage consequences for employees is greater when the 
executives commit fraud and file for bankruptcy rather than file for bankruptcy alone. In column 
4, we present estimates where the fraud firm does not declare bankruptcy within three years after 
the fraud period. The negative wage effects in the fraud and post fraud periods occur right away 
and are highly persistent, though are much less severe than the bankruptcy subsample, fluctuating 
between -6% and -12%. We also map out these effects in Figure 6 Panel B. Note that the 
observation count for this non-bankruptcy subsample is the majority of our full sample. While 
devastating, bankruptcies do not drive the overall wage decline during and after fraudulent 
financial reporting in our main analysis, even employees at fraud firms with much less severe 
shocks suffer negative consequences. 
5.3. Employee Heterogeneity: Movements, Pre-Fraud Wages, and New Hires 
A final source of variation that can help inform why employees suffer these negative wages 
around fraud comes from the employees themselves. From the employee’s perspective, accounting 
fraud may lead to inefficient labor choices. The worker is making an important decision when 
accepting a new job; he or she could be losing firm-specific rents at an old job (Jacobson et al., 
1993), choosing to make new specific investments at the next job (Becker, 1993), and so on. The 
employee plausibly chooses to work for firms involved in accounting fraud, because (media 
coverage about) false financial performance suggests good prospects at the firm. This financial 
misrepresentation makes specific investments with the fraud firm appear to be relatively attractive 
(Lazear, 2009). So, workers stay at or join the fraud firm in the presence of information 
asymmetries; then the fraud is revealed, and workers are displaced or leave suddenly. A theoretical 
explanation is that employees cannot perform a thorough job search. Moreover, they have 
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conducted job-search activities ineffectively, on the job or after a separation, so receive lower 
wages at their next jobs (e.g., Mincer, 1986; Addison and Portugal, 1989; Christensen et al., 2005). 
Similar to these job search frictions, local labor market conditions could play a role. Many former, 
similar employees could be job hunting at the same time, so this “crowded” labor market would 
also negatively affect the job prospects for former employees (e.g., Jacobson et al., 1993; Moretti, 
2011; Bernstein et al., 2018). 
We provide evidence for these mechanisms by using worker movements both at fraud and 
matched control firms. We examine the subsample of employees who leave before three years in 
the post-fraud period (“leaver”); this subsample includes leavers from both fraud and matched 
control firms. So, we condition on a job change for employees at both fraud and non-fraud firms. 
We show these results in column 1 of Table 7. Leavers of fraud firms experience a sharp drop in 
wages during the fraud period that are persistent and negative throughout the fraud and post fraud 
periods, starting at -5% in Fraud(t) and trending down to about -11% to -13%. Job search frictions 
and local labor market conditions for former employees of fraud firms could drive this result; these 
workers may have less time to prepare for a job change and enter labor markets that are crowded 
(and negatively shocked) with other workers that have a similar skill set. For example, former 
energy traders from Enron likely had little time to prepare for a job transition in early 2002 and 
entered a crowded field of other workers with similar skills in the Houston area.  
Fraudulent financial reporting can also affect employees as they interact with their next 
employer. A fraud firm’s reputational damage could negatively affect employees in the labor 
market through “stigma.” That is, even though an employee is not obviously involved with the 
financial-reporting fraud, other employers could associate that portion of the worker’s job history 
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with the reputation of the firm, which is damaged from the revealed fraud.25 We examine an 
additional subsample of leaver employees, those who leave in the first year of the fraud period, 
Fraud(t) (“early leaver”). That is, these workers leave before the fraud is revealed. Again, we 
condition on a job change for employees at both fraud and non-fraud firms. These results are in 
column 2 of Table 7. Despite this pre-fraud revelation job switch, former fraud-firm workers 
experience negative wage effects in the post-fraud period. This evidence could be consistent with 
a “stigma” effect for these workers. Although they no longer work for the fraud firm and are not 
necessarily changing jobs in the post-fraud period, they still experience negative consequences 
after the fraud.26 We map out these results, matched stayers, leavers and early leavers, in Figure 7 
Panel A. 
For completeness, we separately examine a subsample of employees who stay through at least 
three years in the post-fraud period (“stayer”). In Table 7, we present results for stayers in column 
3. We find that these employees have both positive and negative wage effects in the fraud period—
starting at -2.5%, jumping to 3% (both not significant), and dropping to -6%—and later in the post 
fraud period—again starting at -2.5% (again, not significant) and dropping to between -6.5% and 
-11%.27 
                                                 
25  This reaction of hiring managers may be behavioral; the worker could have the same skills and productivity as 
other applicants but is hired less often or paid less (Groysberg et al., 2017). Alternatively, the other employers are 
responding to some probability that a worker from the now-revealed fraudulent firm is less productive or may have 
been involved in the fraud (Gibbons and Katz, 1991). 
26 Another possible explanation is that the new job obtained during the fraud period was a worse match compared to 
new jobs for control workers due to the limitation of job search (Agrawal and Tambe, 2019). For example, we see 
significant negative wage effects during Fraud(t+2), i.e., for long-lasting frauds, after the worker switches. 
27  This pattern could be consistent with lower investment in human capital or lower returns to investment in human 
capital. For example, when capital markets penalize fraud firms in the post fraud period (e.g., Karpoff et al., 2008b), 
these firms may have fewer resources for training employees, hence the slowly downward trending effects, rather 
than the sharp drop. 
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Among employees, some must have perpetrated the fraud. Much of the prior literature has 
examined executives’ private benefits and their optimism (or narcissism) both as triggers of 
accounting fraud (e.g., Beneish, 1999; Armstrong et al., 2010; Schrand and Zechman, 2012; Ham 
et al., 2017). Also, prior literature has examined and found serious consequences for executives 
(e.g., Desai et al., 2006; Karpoff et al., 2008a). If highly paid workers are executives who are 
culpable—at least in part—for the misreporting, we expect to have negative wage consequences 
concentrated among the highly paid as labor markets “settle up” (Fama, 1980). Moreover, our 
results could be the consequences of punitive effects already documented by prior literature. 
We use pre-fraud variation in pay to provide some evidence on whether we only measure an 
effect for culpable executives being punished in the labor market or if non-executives also suffer 
wage drops around fraudulent financial reporting. For columns 4 and 5 in Table 7, we present 
analyses that condition on the pre-fraud period wage level across firms. We split the sample into 
workers who are in the top 10% of the wage distribution (“top 10%”) and the bottom 90% of the 
distribution (“bottom 90%”). Bottom 90% workers are unlikely to have perpetrated the 
misreporting. So we expect that any wage consequences for these workers are the result of 
disruption in labor markets and / or stigma. In column 4, employees in the top 10% do not suffer 
significant negative consequences during or after the fraud period.28  A portion of this “non-
negative” result could be a run up in wages in Pre(t-2) and Pre(t-1). Overall, the negative dip in 
pay during and immediately after the fraud is not severe and not statistically significant using this 
                                                 
28  We show results from a specification with year-industry-county effects estimated within the top 10% using 893 
thousand observations. If there are very few top 10% employees in an industry-county during some year, we might 
be “over controlling” for some of the effect that we want to measure. Using a specification with only year-industry 
effects with the top 10% subsample, we find consistent, negative coefficients throughout the fraud and post-fraud 
periods. The average wage magnitude relative to top 10% employees at control firms for these periods is -16.4%. 
Also, if top 10% employees are more mobile, we could underestimate the negative impact by missing observations 
for those that take their next job in states that do not provide data for our study. 
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specification for the top 10% subsample. Bottom 90% employees, however, experience significant, 
negative wage effects in the fraud and post-fraud periods, around -7% to -9.5% and -8% to -13%, 
respectively. Workers in the bottom 90% of the wage distribution have worse wage consequences 
from fraudulent financial reporting despite the lower likelihood that they are involved with the 
fraud. This result supports and, at the same time, contradicts the findings of John et al. (1992). In 
their paper, financially distressed firms cut their employees rapidly. However, those firms, at the 
same time, exhibit no significant turnover in top managers. On the other hands, accounting fraud 
brings about negative consequences for the entire labor force. We map out these results also in 
Figure 7 Panel B. 
Our final employee characteristic is the period of hire. We have already shown that existing 
employees leave the firm during and after the fraud but during the fraud, these misreporting firms 
have high employee growth. We think that it is natural to examine these new employees that join 
during the fraud period to shed some light on, perhaps, why they join and what earnings 
consequences do they experience. We use a separate sample of “new employees” in Table 7, we 
require that she not work for the sample firm in the year prior to the fraud period, Pre(t-1), and 
work for the firm for the first year of the fraud period, Fraud(t). New employees at the matched 
control firms are also joining in the same, event-time year. 
We present the results for new employees in Table 8, which has a similar structure to the main 
result for existing employees in Table 3. We increase the fineness of fixed effects, estimating 
models with worker effects and year effects, year-industry, and year-industry-county effects in 
columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Across all columns, new employees have negative wage effects 
in the post fraud period (only significant for Pre(t+5) onward in column 3) in the range of -5% 
through -18.5%, depending on specification. Additionally, new employees at fraud firms generally 
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have lower wages in the pre-fraud period, particularly two years before hire: Pre(t-2). Finally, in 
column 3 there is some weak evidence that new employees may initially benefit from this 
employee growth that fraud firms have in Fraud(t); new employees have slightly positive wages, 
relative to new employees at control firms, equal to about 8%.29 We present the results from 
column 3 in Figure 8. 
Overall, these new employees may benefit when being hired into the firm but have long-term, 
negative wage consequences. The cumulative impact for new employees at fraud firms, relative to 
those at control firms, including the hire-year wage bump, is equal to about -15% to -2%, 
depending on specification. These new employees (and the “stayers” among the existing 
employees discussed above) suffer from firm-specific information asymmetry when executives 
perpetrate fraudulent financial reporting, experiencing wage declines in the long run. 30  New 
employees may join because fraudulent reporting prevents them from knowing that the firm 
performance is deteriorating. Otherwise, they might have otherwise taken a different job elsewhere 
(Brown and Matsa, 2016).31 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence on the consequences for employees from fraudulent financial 
reporting. We use employer-employee matched data from the U.S. Census Bureau combined with 
                                                 
29  Alternatively, if workers are aware of (or suspect) accounting fraud, then they would likely require wage premiums 
for risk-sharing with such firms, anticipating some chance that the fraud is revealed and the firm suffers. Instead, a 
near absence of wage increases for new employees combined with employment growth at fraud firms suggests that 
workers would not identify the accounting fraud and thus would not price protect against it. 
30  It is unclear whether the fraud allows the employee to fully understand the risks associated with joining this firm. 
If new workers accept this job in the presence of these informational asymmetries about firm performance, they 
accept despite the increased likelihood of suffering a negative wage shock in the future when the fraud is revealed, 
i.e., the workers do not anticipate future wage declines that the firm cannot protect against (Baily, 1974; Guiso et 
al., 2005; Graham et al., 2016). 
31  Alternatively, fraud firms are increasing headcount and may need to make favorable wage offers to attract new 
employees as there exists some uncertainty about the firm’s reputation given the poor information environment or 
distress associated with accounting fraud (e.g., Benson et al., 2019). 
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SEC enforcement actions against firms with serious misreporting (“fraud”) to examine wages and 
employee turnover. Compared to the employees at non-fraud control firms, we find that employees 
at fraud firms have lower wages during and after periods of fraudulent financial reporting even 
though fraud firms have higher employment growth during the fraud. During the fraud, executives 
appear to change employee composition. Also, we find that employees at fraud firms are more 
likely, compared to a matched sample, to leave the firm, industry, and (even) county of 
employment after the fraud is revealed while fraud firms have negative employee growth.  
We discuss and show evidence consistent with mechanisms for these wage effects. The 
negative change in wages combined with employee displacement and negative employment 
growth at fraud firms indicates workers suffer negative labor market outcomes, for instance losses 
of firm-specific investments, job search inefficiency, and/or entering crowded labor markets. 
Wage losses are worse in thin labor markets and for fraud firms that ultimately declare bankruptcy. 
However, employees of non-bankrupt fraud firms also suffer wage declines, so the effects are not 
isolated to failed firms. We examine early-leaving workers (less affected by job search 
inefficiencies, e.g., Jacobson et al., 1993) and workers in the bottom 90% of the pre-fraud wage 
distribution (less affected by punishment for culpability, e.g., Fama, 1980) and continue to find 
negative wage effects during and after fraudulent financial reporting. This could indicate that 
stigma plays some role even for lower-level employees (e.g., Groysberg et al., 2017). 
We note several important caveats. First, we show evidence that could be consistent with 
certain mechanisms; however, we are unable to isolate the specific effects from any single channel. 
For instance, the stigma from the fraud and disruption to labor markets are both related to the 
severity of the fraud and likely economic shocks to the firm. Consequences for employees can be 
caused by many explanations even when we perform sample splits. Second and related, matched 
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difference-in-differences designs do not necessarily show causation (Roberts and Whited, 2013). 
We find effects that happen concurrently, with little evidence for pre-period trends, so we are 
confident these effects are associated with the fraud but not necessarily caused by it. Third, SEC 
enforcement priorities could respond to more severe employee consequences rather than neutrally 
target cases of serious misreporting. When employees are investors of the firm and suffer 
concentrated, negative consequences to their retirement portfolios (e.g., Ball, 2009), the SEC 
plausibly views this firm and its executives as an important target for enforcement. So, the 
magnitudes that we estimate could, in part, be driven by our use of AAER data. Overall, these 
concerns suggest interpreting our findings with caution; however, our results are useful for 
addressing the research questions. For instance, we find consistent results across the descriptive 
sample splits, using matching and well-controlled regression specifications, and these findings are 
shown with the unique combination of SEC enforcement actions and US Census data.  
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Appendix Table A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Data 
Source 
Dependent Variables 
Annual Real 
Wages 
Annual earnings from a primary employer divided by the 
Consumer Price Index (2010) 
LEHD 
Fraud Firm 
Indicator 
Companies that are identified as accounting-fraud firms by the 
AAER from 1970 through 2014 
CFRM, 
AAERs 
   
Independent Variables 
Fraud 
Indicator 
Workers who are at fraud firms as either an Existing Employee or 
a New Employee 
LEHD 
Pre(t-p) 1 if year τ falls p(=1,2,3,4) year(s) before a fraud firm engaged in 
accounting fraud; 0 otherwise 
CFRM, 
AAERs 
Fraud(t+p) 1 if year τ falls p(=0,1,2) year(s) after the first year of accounting 
fraud and if a fraud firm engaged in accounting fraud in year τ; 0 
otherwise. For long-lasting frauds, we normalize this period to a 
maximum of three years by indicating additional fraud years as 
Fraud(t+2) 
CFRM, 
AAERs 
Post(t+p) 1 if year τ falls p(=3,4,5,6,7,8) year(s) after the first year of 
accounting fraud, normalized so that p=3 is the year after an 
accounting fraud is revealed; 0 otherwise 
CFRM, 
AAERs 
   
Sample Splits 
Existing 
Employee 
Worker at a fraud or control firm for the last two years before a 
fraud firm engaged in accounting fraud, Pret-2 and Pret-1 
LEHD 
New 
Employee 
Worker newly hired in the first year of a fraud period, Fraudt, by a 
fraud or control firm 
LEHD 
Thin / Thick 
Labor 
Markets 
Thin local labor markets have fewer industry-specific employers 
than the median of the number of industry-specific employers in 
local labor markets 
LEHD 
Bankruptcy 
Fraud Firms 
Fraud firms that declare bankruptcy within three years after frauds 
are revealed 
BRD 
Stayer / 
Leaver 
Stayer if an employee continues to work for the fraud or control 
firm three years after the accounting fraud is revealed, Postt+6 
and/or later; leaver otherwise 
LEHD 
Early / Late 
Leaver 
Early leaver if an employee left the fraud or control firm in the 
first year of accounting fraud, Fraudt; late leaver if the fraud or 
control firm in any other year of accounting fraud or within two 
years after accounting fraud is revealed, Fraudt+1 through Postt+5 
LEHD 
Top 10% Workers earn real wages more than or equal to the 10 percentile 
real wage in the wage distribution 
LEHD 
Bottom 90% Workers earn real wages less than the 10 percentile real wage in 
the wage distribution 
LEHD 
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Appendix Table A: Variable Definitions (continued) 
Variable Definition Data 
Source 
Firm Controls 
Size Natural log of total assets (data6) Compustat 
Return on 
Assets 
Operating income after depreciation (data178) divided by total 
assets (data6) 
Compustat 
Leverage The ratio of total debt (data9+data34) to market value of assets, 
which is calculated by multiplying the number of shares 
outstanding (data25) by the stock price (data199) and by adding 
total debt (data9+data34) to it 
Compustat 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets divided by book value of assets (data6), 
where market value of assets is calculated by 
(data25*data199+data9+data34) 
Compustat 
Employee 
Growth 
Natural log of this year’s employment minus natural log of last 
year’s employment 
LBD 
Avg. Annual 
Real Wages 
Total wage bill divided by employment LBD 
   
Employee Controls 
Age Age of an employee in an event year of accounting fraud LEHD 
Education Four levels of education are transformed into numerical values by 
using the highest number of years in each category: less than high 
school (1-8), high school or equivalent, no college (9), some 
college or associate degree (10-12), and bachelor’s degree or 
advanced degree (13-16) 
LEHD 
Experience Age of a worker in year t minus education minus 6 LEHD 
Female 1 if a person is female; 0 otherwise LEHD 
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Appendix Table B: Probit Model 
This table shows the results of a probit model estimating a propensity score to engage in accounting fraud. Accounting-
fraud firms are identified by the AAER. Fraud firms are included in sample firms in the year prior to accounting fraud, 
Pre(t-1). Non-fraud firms are included in sample firms if they operate businesses in the same industry as one of fraud 
firms in the year prior to accounting fraud. The sample period is from 1991 to 2008. Appendix Table A defines 
variables. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. Number 
of observations are rounded to comply with disclosure requirements of the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 (1) 
Dependent Variable: Fraud-Firm Indicator  
Size 0.098*** 
 (0.018) 
Return on Assets 0.255* 
 (0.153) 
Leverage -0.138 
 (0.137) 
Tobin’s Q 0.015** 
 (0.007) 
Employee Growth 0.215*** 
 (0.076) 
Ln(Avg. Annual Real Wages) 0.020 
 (0.072) 
Observations 16,000 
Chi-squared 144.2 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0777 
 
  
49 
Table 1. Fraud Firms 
Panel A. Comparison of Sample Fraud and Matched Control Firms 
This table compares fraud firms’ to control firms’ characteristics in the year prior to accounting fraud, Pre(t-1). 
Accounting-fraud firms are identified by the AAER. Control firms are matched to fraud firms based on a propensity 
score estimated in Appendix Table B. The sample period is from 1991 to 2008. Appendix Table A defines variables. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. Significance below 
these conventional levels is indicated with “ns.” Number of observations are rounded to comply with disclosure 
requirements of the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fraud 
Firms 
Non-Fraud 
Firms 
T Tests of Differences 
(Fraud minus Non-Fraud) 
   Difference Significance 
Size 6.372 6.248 0.125 ns 
Assets ($M) 5,328 3,998 1,330 ns 
Return on Assets .0693 .0713 -0.0020 ns 
Leverage .2408 .2173 0.0235 ns 
Tobin’s Q 2.458 2.471 -0.013 ns 
Employee growth .1672 .1665 0.0007 ns 
Avg. Annual Real Wages 53.72 55.17 -1.45 ns 
Observations 200 200   
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Table 1. Fraud Firms 
Panel B. Comparative Descriptive Statistics on Sample and All Fraud Firms 
This table compares statistics on samples of fraud firms. Column (1) indicates descriptive statistics of sample fraud 
companies, and column (2) indicates descriptive statistics of all fraud firms. Column (3) indicates signed differences 
between columns 1 and 2. Fraud firms are identified by the AAER. All fraud companies are required to have relevant 
Compustat data. They engaged in accounting fraud from 1970 to 2014. Sample fraud companies are required to have 
relevant Compustat, LBD, and LEHD data. They engaged in accounting fraud from 1991 to 2008. Appendix Table A 
defines variables. Number of observations are rounded to comply with disclosure requirements of the U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
 (1) (2) 
 Sample Fraud 
Firms 
All Fraud 
Firms 
Size 6.372 5.423 
Assets ($M) 5,328 4,102 
Return on Assets .0693 .0157 
Leverage .2408 .2552 
Tobin’s Q 2.458 2.838 
Observations 200 500 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Employees of Fraud and Control Firms 
This table shows differences for averages of employees at fraud and control firms. Accounting-fraud firms in the 
sample commit financial misrepresentation from 1991 to 2008 according to the AAER. Fraud firms are matched with 
control firms using a propensity score estimated in Appendix Table B. Appendix Table A defines variables. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. Significance below these 
conventional levels is indicated with “ns.” Number of observations are rounded to comply with disclosure 
requirements of the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Fraud 
Firms 
Non-Fraud 
Firms 
T-Test of Differences 
(Fraud minus Non-Fraud) 
   Difference Significance 
Education 12.41 12.29 0.12 ns 
Age 40.40 38.80 1.60 * 
Experience 21.99 20.51 1.48 * 
Annual Real Wages 73,210 64,730 8,480 ns 
Female .4252 .4351 -0.0099 ns 
Observations 414,000 286,000   
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Table 3. Dynamics of Earnings for Fraud Firm Employees 
This table reports estimates from OLS regression analyses estimating equation (2): estimates for wage effects at fraud 
firms in the by-event-time years. Accounting-fraud firms in the sample commit financial misrepresentation from 1991 
to 2008 according to the AAER. Appendix Table A defines variables. Standard errors are in parentheses and calculated 
with clustering by pre-fraud employer (i.e., fraud firm or matched control firm). Statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. Number of observations are rounded to comply with 
disclosure requirements of the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable = 
Ln(Annual Real Wages) 
Year 
Effects 
Year- Industry 
Effects 
Year- Industry- 
County 
Effects 
Pre(t-4) × Fraud Ind. -0.045 -0.011 -0.008 
 (0.038) (0.033) (0.015) 
Pre(t-3) × Fraud Ind. -0.078* -0.025 -0.0093 
 (0.047) (0.037) (0.021) 
Pre(t-2) × Fraud Ind. -0.083* -0.041 0.032 
 (0.044) (0.034) (0.027) 
Pre(t-1) × Fraud Ind. -0.080* -0.061* 0.017 
 (0.048) (0.033) (0.031) 
Fraud(t) × Fraud Ind. -0.168** -0.124*** -0.066** 
 (0.073) (0.048) (0.031) 
Fraud(t+1) × Fraud Ind. -0.149*** -0.120** -0.078** 
 (0.057) (0.047) (0.037) 
Fraud(t+2) × Fraud Ind. -0.192*** -0.146*** -0.093*** 
 (0.070) (0.051) (0.032) 
Post(t+3) × Fraud Ind. -0.137** -0.114** -0.077** 
 (0.067) (0.045) (0.030) 
Post(t+4) × Fraud Ind. -0.160** -0.129*** -0.080** 
 (0.065) (0.047) (0.035) 
Post(t+5) × Fraud Ind. -0.194*** -0.160*** -0.110*** 
 (0.074) (0.054) (0.042) 
Post(t+6) × Fraud Ind. -0.197** -0.159*** -0.090** 
 (0.084) (0.055) (0.042) 
Post(t+7) × Fraud Ind. -0.173* -0.147** -0.098** 
 (0.088) (0.058) (0.042) 
Post(t+8) × Fraud Ind. -0.228** -0.197** -0.128*** 
 (0.114) (0.078) (0.045) 
Controls and main effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects 
Year, 
Worker 
Year × 
Industry, 
Worker 
Year × 
Industry × 
County, 
Worker 
Observations 9,062,000 9,062,000 9,038,000 
R-squared 0.550 0.586 0.634 
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Table 4. Dynamics of Displacement for Employees 
This table shows averages and differences of employee retention at fraud and matched control firms. Accounting-
fraud firms in the sample commit financial misrepresentation from 1991 to 2008 according to the AAER. Fraud firms 
are matched with control firms using a propensity score estimated in Appendix Table B. These indicator variables 
equal one if an employee stays at the firm, in the industry, or in the county and equal zero otherwise. Specifically, if 
we observe the employee with their next job at the same firm, or in the same industry, or in the same county as the 
firm where the employee is employed during periods Pret-1 and Pret-2, then the indicator variable equals one. We 
calculate these indicators for periods Fraud(t), Post(t+5), and Post(t+8). Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. Significance below these conventional levels is indicated with 
“ns.” Number of observations are rounded to comply with disclosure requirements of the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Fraud 
Firms 
Non-Fraud 
Firms 
T-Test of Differences 
(Fraud minus Non-Fraud) 
   Sign Significance 
Fraud(t)     
   % Stay at Firm 87.3% 90.8% -3.5% ** 
   % Stay in Industry 85.5% 90.6% -5.1% ns 
   % Stay in County 88.5% 88.7% -0.2% ns 
Post(t+5)     
   % Stay at Firm 37.6% 54.8% -17.2% *** 
   % Stay in Industry 44.6% 59.1% -14.5% *** 
   %Stay in County 50.7% 63.1% -12.4% *** 
Post(t+8)     
   % Stay at Firm 26.1% 41.0% -14.9% ** 
   % Stay in Industry 33.3% 46.5% -13.2% ** 
   % Stay in County 39.3% 50.5% -11.2% *** 
Observations 414,000 286,000   
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Table 5. Robustness: Alternative Matching 
This table reports estimates from OLS regression analyses estimating equation (2): estimates for wage effects at fraud 
firms in the by-event-time years. We use a separate sample of newly hired employees that first receive wages at the 
fraud or matched control firm in period Fraud(t), i.e., the first year of the fraud. Accounting-fraud firms in the sample 
commit financial misrepresentation from 1991 to 2008 according to the AAER. Appendix Table A defines variables. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and calculated with clustering by fraud-period employer (i.e., fraud firm or matched 
control firm). Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Number of observations are rounded to comply with disclosure requirements of the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 (1) (2) 
Matching: 
Fraud Period, 
Unmanaged Sales 
Growth 
Within-Firm 
Employee 
Characteristics 
Dependent Variable = 
Ln(Annual Real Wages) 
  
Pre(t-4) × Fraud Ind. 0.021 0.022 
 (0.014) (0.018) 
Pre(t-3) × Fraud Ind. 0.013 0.024 
 (0.020) (0.017) 
Pre(t-2) × Fraud Ind. 0.037 0.074** 
 (0.026) (0.034) 
Pre(t-1) × Fraud Ind. 0.013 0.099 
 (0.032) (0.067) 
Fraud(t) × Fraud Ind. -0.062** -0.019 
 (0.029) (0.022) 
Fraud(t+1) × Fraud Ind. -0.057 -0.028 
 (0.038) (0.032) 
Fraud(t+2) × Fraud Ind. -0.099** -0.044* 
 (0.039) (0.024) 
Post(t+3) × Fraud Ind. -0.077** -0.021 
 (0.032) (0.022) 
Post(t+4) × Fraud Ind. -0.095** -0.042 
 (0.037) (0.034) 
Post(t+5) × Fraud Ind. -0.124*** -0.099** 
 (0.042) (0.045) 
Post(t+6) × Fraud Ind. -0.120*** -0.029 
 (0.044) (0.039) 
Post(t+7) × Fraud Ind. -0.128*** -0.021 
 (0.045) (0.039) 
Post(t+8) × Fraud Ind. -0.147*** -0.035 
 (0.047) (0.038) 
Controls and main effects Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects 
Year × Industry × 
County, Worker 
Year × Industry × 
County, Worker 
Observations 8,761,000 2,602,000 
R-squared 0.636 0.674 
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Table 6. Employee Earnings and Market and Firm Heterogeneity 
This table reports estimates from OLS regression analyses estimating equation (2): estimates for wage effects at fraud 
firms in the by-event-time years. We divide the sample into “thick” and “thin” markets that have above and below 
median, respectively, within-industry employers in the same county. We present results for “thick” (“thin”) markets 
in columns (1) (in column (2)). We divide the sample into bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy fraud firms along with their 
matched pair. Results for firms that ultimately (do not) go into bankrupt are present in column (3) (in column (4)). We 
present estimates from specifications with Year × Industry × County effects throughout. Appendix Table A defines 
variables. Standard errors are in parentheses and calculated with clustering by pre-fraud employer (i.e., fraud firm or 
matched control firm). Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. Number of observations are rounded to comply with disclosure requirements of the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable = 
Ln(Annual Real Wages) 
Thick 
Markets 
Thin 
Markets 
Bankruptcy 
Fraud Firms 
Non-Bankruptcy 
Fraud Firms 
Pre(t-4) × Fraud Ind. 0.005 -0.062** 0.018 -0.012 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.051) (0.015) 
Pre(t-3) × Fraud Ind. 0.016 -0.066*** 0.013 -0.013 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.090) (0.021) 
Pre(t-2) × Fraud Ind. 0.061* -0.044 -0.061 0.031 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.092) (0.028) 
Pre(t-1) × Fraud Ind. 0.081** -0.110*** 0.008 0.019 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.070) (0.033) 
Fraud(t) × Fraud Ind. -0.007 -0.171*** -0.031 -0.062* 
 (0.036) (0.046) (0.112) (0.032) 
Fraud(t+1) × Fraud Ind. -0.013 -0.185*** -0.175** -0.072* 
 (0.039) (0.050) (0.083) (0.038) 
Fraud(t+2) × Fraud Ind. -0.060 -0.159*** -0.188** -0.088*** 
 (0.038) (0.049) (0.085) (0.034) 
Post(t+3) × Fraud Ind. -0.030 -0.154*** -0.312*** -0.065** 
 (0.035) (0.047) (0.085) (0.031) 
Post(t+4) × Fraud Ind. -0.074 -0.107** -0.263*** -0.073** 
 (0.047) (0.043) (0.088) (0.037) 
Post(t+5) × Fraud Ind. -0.095* -0.138*** -0.296*** -0.103** 
 (0.056) (0.045) (0.078) (0.044) 
Post(t+6) × Fraud Ind. -0.063 -0.132*** -0.183** -0.083* 
 (0.056) (0.044) (0.079) (0.045) 
Post(t+7) × Fraud Ind. -0.070 -0.152*** -0.269*** -0.090** 
 (0.058) (0.043) (0.078) (0.044) 
Post(t+8) × Fraud Ind. -0.091 -0.185*** -0.196** -0.126*** 
 (0.059) (0.053) (0.078) (0.047) 
Controls and main effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects 
Year × 
Industry × 
County, 
Worker 
Year × 
Industry × 
County, 
Worker 
Year × 
Industry × 
County, 
Worker 
Year × 
Industry × 
County, 
Worker 
Observations 4,508,000 4,507,000 329,000 8,694,000 
R-squared 0.654 0.630 0.736 0.633 
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Table 7. Employee Earnings, Movements, and Pre-Fraud Wage Levels 
This table reports estimates from OLS regression analyses estimating equation (2): estimates for wage effects at fraud 
firms in the by-event-time years. We divide the sample conditional on worker movements in columns (1)-(3). In 
column (1), we limit the sample to workers who leave the fraud or matched control firm prior to or in period Post(t+5), 
i.e., leaves at the latest three years after the fraud concludes. In column (2), we limit the sample to workers who leave 
in period Fraudt, i.e., the first year of the fraud. In column (3), we limit the sample to workers who remain with the 
fraud or matched control firm through at least period Post(t+5), i.e., stays at least three years after the fraud concludes. 
In columns (4) and (5), we present subsamples of employees in the top 10% and bottom 90% of the pre-fraud wage 
distribution, respectively. We present estimates from specifications with Year × Industry × County effects throughout. 
Appendix Table A defines variables. Standard errors are in parentheses and calculated with clustering by pre-fraud 
employer (i.e., fraud firm or matched control firm). Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated 
by *, **, and ***, respectively. Number of observations are rounded to comply with disclosure requirements of the 
U.S. Census Bureau. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable = 
Ln(Annual Real Wages) 
Leavers 
Early 
Leavers 
Stayers 
Top 
10% 
Bottom 
90% 
Pre(t-4) × Fraud Ind. 0.006 -0.019 -0.028* 0.007 -0.010 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.025) (0.015) 
Pre(t-3) × Fraud Ind. -0.004 -0.045* -0.016 -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.028) (0.022) 
Pre(t-2) × Fraud Ind. 0.019 -0.002 -0.000 0.030 0.032 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.026) (0.037) (0.029) 
Pre(t-1) × Fraud Ind. 0.001 -0.024 -0.010 0.068 0.012 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.032) (0.072) (0.033) 
Fraud(t) × Fraud Ind. -0.051** -0.047 -0.025 -0.017 -0.072** 
 (0.026) (0.043) (0.037) (0.076) (0.031) 
Fraud(t+1) × Fraud Ind. -0.082** -0.069 0.029 -0.035 -0.084** 
 (0.035) (0.046) (0.040) (0.060) (0.037) 
Fraud(t+2) × Fraud Ind. -0.089*** -0.096** -0.062* -0.026 -0.099*** 
 (0.033) (0.044) (0.035) (0.060) (0.032) 
Post(t+3) × Fraud Ind. -0.057* -0.041 -0.025 -0.040 -0.081*** 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.037) (0.055) (0.031) 
Post(t+4) × Fraud Ind. -0.050 -0.040 -0.049 0.005 -0.088** 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.034) (0.059) (0.035) 
Post(t+5) × Fraud Ind. -0.099** -0.066 -0.088** 0.016 -0.121*** 
 (0.044) (0.049) (0.039) (0.063) (0.041) 
Post(t+6) × Fraud Ind. -0.101** -0.076 -0.055 0.033 -0.099** 
 (0.046) (0.050) (0.039) (0.052) (0.043) 
Post(t+7) × Fraud Ind. -0.112** -0.095* -0.069* -0.022 -0.104** 
 (0.047) (0.054) (0.041) (0.044) (0.043) 
Post(t+8) × Fraud Ind. -0.137*** -0.114** -0.116** -0.036 -0.134*** 
 (0.050) (0.054) (0.045) (0.044) (0.046) 
Controls and main effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects 
Year × 
Industry × 
County, 
Worker 
Year × 
Industry × 
County, 
Worker 
Year × 
Industry × 
County, 
Worker 
Year × 
Industry × 
County, 
Worker 
Year × 
Industry × 
County, 
Worker 
Observations 4,837,000 920,000 4,182,000 893,000 8,132,000 
R-squared 0.604 0.585 0.713 0.555 0.586 
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Table 8. Dynamics of Earnings for Newly Hired Employees at Fraud Firm 
This table reports estimates from OLS regression analyses estimating equation (2): estimates for wage effects at fraud 
firms in the by-event-time years. We use a separate sample of newly hired employees that first receive wages at the 
fraud or matched control firm in period Fraudt, i.e., the first year of the fraud. Accounting-fraud firms in the sample 
commit financial misrepresentation from 1991 to 2008 according to the AAER. Appendix Table A defines variables. 
Standard errors are in parentheses and calculated with clustering by fraud-period employer (i.e., fraud firm or matched 
control firm). Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Number of observations are rounded to comply with disclosure requirements of the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable = 
Ln(Annual Real Wages) 
Year 
Effects 
Year- Industry 
Effects 
Year- Industry- 
County 
Effects 
Pre(t-4) × Fraud Ind. -0.025 -0.007 -0.020* 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.011) 
Pre(t-3) × Fraud Ind. -0.044 -0.016 -0.022 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.015) 
Pre(t-2) × Fraud Ind. -0.084** -0.057*** -0.041** 
 (0.034) (0.021) (0.019) 
Pre(t-1) × Fraud Ind. -0.046 -0.013 -0.025 
 (0.057) (0.036) (0.032) 
Fraud(t) × Fraud Ind. -0.036 0.067 0.080* 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.041) 
Fraud(t+1) × Fraud Ind. -0.171*** -0.053* -0.022 
 (0.058) (0.029) (0.026) 
Fraud(t+2) × Fraud Ind. -0.178*** -0.060** -0.013 
 (0.048) (0.024) (0.023) 
Post(t+3) × Fraud Ind. -0.191*** -0.069*** -0.023 
 (0.049) (0.024) (0.023) 
Post(t+4) × Fraud Ind. -0.179*** -0.073*** -0.027 
 (0.040) (0.026) (0.019) 
Post(t+5) × Fraud Ind. -0.193*** -0.080*** -0.046** 
 (0.040) (0.023) (0.019) 
Post(t+6) × Fraud Ind. -0.188*** -0.083*** -0.037* 
 (0.042) (0.027) (0.020) 
Post(t+7) × Fraud Ind. -0.194*** -0.100*** -0.048** 
 (0.043) (0.027) (0.021) 
Post(t+8) × Fraud Ind. -0.192*** -0.090*** -0.049** 
 (0.045) (0.027) (0.021) 
Controls and main effects Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects 
Year, 
Worker 
Year × 
Industry, 
Worker 
Year × 
Industry × 
County, 
Worker 
Observations 3,289,000 3,289,000 3,265,000 
R-squared 0.587 0.619 0.651 
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Figure 1: A Framework for the Impact of Fraud on Labor Markets 
Feature of Accounting Fraud   Mechanism Affecting Labor Costs: 
Wages and Turnover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This figure depicts graphically the discussion in Section 2. We show features of accounting fraud 
in the leftmost set of boxes and associate these features with mechanisms that could affect labor 
costs (i.e., worker wages and turnover) in the rightmost set of boxes. 
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Figure 2: A Fraud Example, Timeline, and Employees 
 
Fraud Firm Timeline: 
Baseline Pre-Fraud Period Fraud Period Post-Fraud Period 
Baseline Baseline Pre Pre Pre Pre Fraud Fraud Fraud Post Post Post Post Post Post 
(t-6) (t-5) (t-4) (t-3) (t-2) (t-1) (t) (t+1) (t+2) (t+3) (t+4) (t+5) (t+6) (t+7) (t+8) 
 
 
Employee Types: Existing Employee New Employee 
 
This figure is a representation of the accounting-fraud timeline. The fraud is split into three periods. The “Baseline” period is the first 
two years prior to the three periods of interest, Baselinet-6 and Baselinet-5. The “Pre-Fraud Period” extends for up to four years prior to 
the beginning of the fraud from the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). We indicate these years as Pre(t-4), Pre(t-
3), Pre(t-2), and Pre(t-1). The “Fraud Period” extends for the length of the fraud and must result in misreporting of an annual financial 
statement (e.g., a single quarter of fraud that is corrected within a fiscal year would be excluded). The Fraud Period is determined by the 
start year and end year of financial misrepresentation from the AAER. We indicate these years as Fraud(t), Fraud(t+1), and Fraud(t+2). 
For long-lasting frauds, we normalize this period to a maximum of three years by indicating additional fraud years as Fraud(t+2). The 
“Post-Fraud Period” extends for up to six years after the conclusions of the fraud from the AAER. We indicate these years as Post(t+3), 
Post(t+4), Post(t+5), Post(t+6), Post(t+7), and Post(t+8). 
We classify employees into two types. “Existing Employees” are workers at fraud (or control) firms prior to the beginning of the fraud 
indicated in the AAER. We require that existing employees worked for a fraud firm or a control firm for the last two years before a fraud 
firm engaged in accounting fraud, Pre(t-2) and Pre(t-1). We do not require that we are able to observe the hire date if the employee 
works for the firm before our sample begins. Existing employees comprise our main sample across most tables, i.e., all except Table 7. 
“New Employees” are workers at fraud (or control) firms hired during the Fraud Period. We require that new employees were hired in 
the first year of a fraud period by a fraud firm or a control firm, Fraud(t). We report results for new employees in Table 7. 
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Figure 3: Employment Growth Levels 
This figure shows estimates for employment growth at fraud firms in the by-event-time years. Point estimates are growth levels at fraud 
and matched control firms. We use LBD data. 
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Figure 4: Dynamics of Earnings for Fraud Firm Employees 
This figure shows magnitude estimates from OLS regression analyses estimating equation (2): estimates for wage effects at fraud firms 
in the by-event-time years. Point estimates are incremental earnings of employees at fraud firms relative to those at matched control 
firms. We adjust the coefficient estimates from column (3) in Table 3 to percentages. We also show 95% confidence interval estimates 
as vertical bars through the point estimates; standard errors are calculated with clustering by pre-fraud employer (i.e., fraud firm or 
matched control firm). 
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Figure 5: Wage Trends for Fraud Firm Employees Conditional on Movement 
This figure shows magnitude estimates from OLS regression analyses estimating equation (2) expanded to include interactions between 
Fraud Ind. and indicators for fraud firm employee movements. We include indicators for Stayers, Late Leavers, and Early Leavers. We 
report estimates for wage effects at fraud firms in by-event-time years. Point estimates are incremental earnings of employees at fraud 
firms relative to those at matched control firms, pooled and not conditioned on movement. 
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Figure 6: Wage Trends across Market and Firm Heterogeneity 
This figure shows magnitude estimates from Table 6. We adjust the coefficient estimates to 
percentages. Wage trends are incremental for fraud firm employees relative to matched controls. 
Panel A: Market Heterogeneity 
 
Panel B: Firm Heterogeneity 
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Figure 7: Wage Trends across Worker Heterogeneity 
This figure shows magnitude estimates from Table 7. We adjust the coefficient estimates to 
percentages. Wage trends are incremental for fraud firm employees relative to matched controls. 
Panel A: Worker Movements 
 
Panel B: Pre-Fraud Wage Levels 
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Figure 8: Dynamics of Earnings for Fraud-Period-Hire Employees at Fraud Firms 
This figure shows magnitude estimates from OLS regression analyses estimating equation (2) for employees hired during the first year 
of the fraud, Fraud(t): estimates for wage effects at fraud firms in the by-event-time years. Point estimates are incremental earnings of 
employees at fraud firms relative to those at matched control firms. We adjust the coefficient estimates from column (3) in Table 8 to 
percentages. We also show 95% confidence interval estimates as vertical bars through the point estimates; standard errors are calculated 
with clustering by fraud-period employer (i.e., fraud firm or matched control firm). 
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